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A
mAbstract: This paper investigates to what extent international migration can be
explained by climatic variations. A gravity model of migration augmented with
average temperature and precipitation in the country of origin is estimated using a
panel data set of 142 sending countries for the period 1995 to 2006. We find two
primary results. First, temperature is positively correlated with migration. Second,
stronger changes in precipitation are also associated with aligned, but small changes
in migration. Both effects are robust to various model modifications. Furthermore, we
present initial explorations into the channels relating climate changes with migration
via agriculture and internal conflict.
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The nexus between climate change and migration has been addressed since the early
1990s by political scientists, environmentalists and demographers. In particular, the
discussion intensified after the release of the conclusions of the Fourth Assessment Re-
port of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007). The report refers to
the “potential for population migration” due to climate distress. The topic has received
substantial media coverage but limited academic research.
Although a number of recent policy publications are concerned with the impacts of
climate change on migration, most of them are case studies for specific regions/coun-
tries and time episodes. Surprisingly, only few empirical studies attempt to quantify
this impact on a larger scale. While the standard statistical migration literature exam-
ines socioeconomic drivers of bilateral migration without considering climate factors
at all, at least a number of recent studies focuses on natural disasters and extreme
events as drivers of migration (e.g., Warner et al. 2009).
In this paper, we focus on permanent emigration due to gradual changes in climate.
We follow the approach by Dell et al. (2008), but our outcome variable is emigration
instead of economic growth. The main aim of the paper is to derive estimates of the
effect of changes in climate variables, namely temperature and precipitation, on migra-
tory flows from 142 countries of origin into 19 OECD countries over time and across
countries. In particular, we estimate a gravity-type model augmented with climate vari-
ables while controlling for the established socioeconomic factors.2015 Backhaus et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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higher migration flow between a country pair. Changes in precipitation are also posi-
tively and significantly correlated with migration, but to a lower extent. These findings
are robust to various model modifications. Furthermore, emigration from more
agriculturally-dependent countries appears to be related to changes in temperature
only, while less agricultural countries are merely affected by precipitation changes when
it comes to emigration. A state’s internal fragility on the other hand seems to have a
direct effect on emigration, but no significant interaction with climate change.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
bilateral migration and climate change. Section 3 refers to the related theoretical
models and derives the main empirical specification. Section 4 presents the empirical
application, the main results, our robustness checks, as well as the explorations into
two potential channels between climatic variations and migration. Section 5 concludes.2. Literature review
We distinguish between existing studies focusing on the more general socioeconomic
determinants of international migration on the one hand and more specific ones adding
climate and environmental variables on the other hand.
Within the first category, studies on migration from many origins to many destina-
tions include Mayda (2010), for 79 countries of origin to 14 OECD countries over the
period 1980–1995, and the more recent Ruyssen et al. (2014), who investigate the de-
terminants of bilateral migrant flows to 19 OECD countries between 1998 and 2007
from both advanced and developing countries of origin. In general, they find solid evi-
dence for the importance of economic differentials between the sending and the host
countries.
It is notable that among the works focusing on the impact of climate and environ-
mental factors on migration, the majority of them put an emphasis on natural disasters
rather than climate trends as potential push factors. An overview of this literature can
be found in Belasen and Polachek (2013). Naudé (2009) studies the determinants of
emigration from 43 African countries of origin, excluding bilateral migration, over 5-year
intervals during the period 1960–2005. The main environmental measure used is the sum
of weather and seismic disasters in the respective country of origin, which is found to
increase emigration. Using bilateral migration data, Reuveny and Moore (2009) cover
emigration from 107 countries to 15 OECD host countries over the period 1986–1995.
However, only weather-related disasters and the area of crop and arable land are used as
proxies for climate change. Aside disasters, crop land is found to have a significantly
positive effect on emigration, which the authors interpret as an indication of distributional
conflicts within developing sending countries.
A paper closely related to our work is the gravity study by Afifi and Warner (2008)
that estimates a gravity model augmented with thirteen environmental factors, which in
general have a significant and positive impact on migration. Its main shortcoming is
that all the environmental factors are modeled as “event” dummy variables taking the
values zero or one without accounting for the magnitude of the factors. Further, only a
single cross-section of data is employed. We depart from these approaches by focusing
on within-country variation in temperature and precipitation and hence take into
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data also allows us to rectify the potential problem of unobserved heterogeneity across
countries.
Finally, Beine and Parsons (2013) consider both natural disasters and climatic varia-
tions as potential drivers of bilateral migration flows. However, their data provide infor-
mation on migration in ten year intervals only, which is why their analysis is oriented
towards medium- and long-run effects of climate volatility. Their results do not show
any direct effect of the latter on international migration flows.
3. Theoretical background and model specification
Our benchmark specification is a gravity model augmented with climate variables. The
non-climate control variables in the gravity model are derived from neoclassical theory,
namely economic, demographic, geographic and cultural controls, as well as the trade-
to-GDP share:
lnMijt ¼ αo þ α1wtempit þ α2wpreit þ α3GDPit þ α4GDPjt þ α5DemPresit
þα6 lnPopulationit þ α7Ujt þ α8Tradeit þ γt þ ωij þ εijt;
ð1Þ
where Mijt denotes migration inflows from country i to country j in year t. A fre-
quently used alternative to the logarithm of migration flows is the emigration rate,
which is defined as the flow of population from country i to country j in year t divided
by country i’s population in year t. However, it is not identifiable whether changes in
the emigration rate over time arise from changes in the migration flows, changes in the
population size aside from emigration, or both. Therefore, the logarithm of the migra-
tion flows is used as the dependent variable while controlling for general population
dynamics by including the logarithm of the emigration country’s population.
The population‐weighted average annual temperature in degrees Celsius is denoted
wtempit, while wpreit denotes average annual precipitation in millimeters. The idea be-
hind using population weights is to make the climate data reflect more precisely how
strongly the inhabitants within a given country are actually affected by variations in
temperature and precipitation, following the approach proposed by Dell et al. (2014).
GDPit (GDPjt) denotes PPP-adjusted GDP per capita divided by a factor 1000 in the
origin (destination) country in year t. A squared term of GDPit is also included in all
specifications to account for non-linear effects of income in the origin country.
DemPresit denotes the share of young people in the country of origin’s working age
population.
Ujt denotes the unemployment rate in the country of destination at time t, which
controls for the absorptive capacity of the receiving country’s labor market, while
Tradeit denotes the openness ratio, (Exports + Imports)/GDP, in the country of origin
at time t.
The term ωij captures country-pair characteristics, while a set of year dummies γt
captures global shocks. Finally, εijt is the error term.
4. Empirical application
4.1 Data and variables
Data on yearly average temperature and precipitation in the countries of origin stem
from Dell et al. (2008) and cover the period 1995–2006, yielding 12 time periods for
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ables they use are population-weighted averages using 1990 population figures. Figure 1
presents histograms of the changes in average temperature and precipitation in our
sample. While we can accept the hypotheses that the means of the two distributions
are greater than zero, the distributions are more centered than one might expect in the
context of climate change. Further, the majority of the yearly changes appear to be ra-
ther subtle, as only 5.4% of the temperature changes in our sample fall outside the
interval [−1, 1] degree Celsius, and 1.65% of the changes in precipitation fall outside
the interval [−5, 5] millimeters.
Figure 2 depicts the average changes in temperature and precipitation globally (i.e.,
pooling observations from all countries of origin in the sample) over time. While the
two series exhibit a strong negative correlation, their volatility around the pooled global
mean of all sending countries and all time periods decreases considerably after the year
2000.
The corresponding data on yearly migration flows from source to destination coun-
tries originate primarily from the OECD’s International Migration Database (IMD,
2014). We select 19 OECD members as destination countries on the basis of data avail-
ability, while examining inflows from 142 countries of origin. Some of the latter are
members of the OECD as well, e.g., Mexico. Although Mexico might be an important
destination country itself from the perspective of less developed countries, its role as a
sending country is probably more important in our context. A complete list of the
source and destination countries together with their respective share of non-missing
migration flow observations can be found in Table 5 in the Appendix. The IMD is
constructed on the basis of statistical reports of the OECD member countries, which
implies that the data might not be fully internationally comparable as the criteria for
registering population and the conditions for granting residence permits vary across
countries. Illegal migration flows are only partially covered as data are only obtained
through censuses. Further, the majority of the countries of destination did not record
immigrants from the full set of source countries during the first few years of our period
of analysis; thus, missing data are most frequent in this period. In the cases of Japan
and the Republic of Korea, only the inflows from the most important regional sending
countries have been recorded over a longer period of time. Regarding the European
destination countries, data on inflows into Italy are missing for many source countries
and is completely unavailable for the years 1995–1997 and 2003. Fortunately, we wereFigure 1 Changes in average temperature and precipitation.
Figure 2 Global volatility in average temperature and precipitation.
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(Eurostat 2014). For Austria, Switzerland, and the UK, numerous non-European source
countries could be added. Moreover, some rounded and inaccurate figures for the UK
could be replaced. Adding and replacing rounded observations was only done if the fig-
ures from the OECD and the Eurostat databases coincided for countries for which data
are available in both databases. In this way, we can be relatively sure that the same defi-
nitions of immigration are used in both data sources and that the consistency of our
dataset is not compromised by combining them. However, the Eurostat data collection
starts only in 1998, so that previous years remain unchanged. The data are predomin-
antly complete for France, Spain, and Germany though, which together absorb about
60% of the migratory flows to Europe in our sample. Data from Australia, Canada, and
the United States cover inflows from almost all source countries for all or nearly all
time periods, reflecting the long history of immigration in these countries. With
12 years, 142 countries of origin, and 19 countries of destination, we would obtain a
maximum of 32,376 observations. However, 13,190 of the observations remain missing.
But we can claim to have obtained a dataset as comprehensive as possible of immigra-
tion to OECD countries by combining OECD and Eurostat information where it was
possible. The evolution of the migration flows from the perspective of the receiving
countries is depicted in Figure 3.
Data for the economic and demographic variables are obtained from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI 2014) database. Table 1 presents summary
statistics of the main variables included in our model.4.2 Estimates of the static model
The augmented gravity model introduced in Section 3 is estimated for a sample of 142
origins and 19 destinations over the period 1995 to 2006. In our empirical model, we
allow the country-pair effects ωij to be correlated with the explanatory variables.
Possible reasoning behind this assumption is, e.g., that each destination country has its
own unobservable, time-constant mentality towards immigration that affects actual
immigration flows, or that there exist specific stable relations between some source and
destination countries. The country-pair unobserved heterogeneity could be controlled
for by applying a transformation that eliminates the time-invariant effects, such as the
fixed effects (FE) or the first differences (FD). This would also wipe out any unilateral
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
migration flows 19446 1585.36 7552.45 0 218822
log migration flows 17587 4.76 2.46 0 12.3
wtemp 32376 20.64 6.89 −1.56 29.58
wpre 32376 10.91 7.41 0.07 40.57
GDP origin 1000 30495 5.58 7.92 0.123 65.18
GDP destination 1000 32376 27.1 6.19 12.8 52.04
unemployment rate destination 32376 6.94 3.32 2 22.7
log population 32376 15.81 1.69 11.76 20.99
demographic pressure 32376 59.48 6.49 47.72 81.72
trade to GDP ratio 30704 81.78 38.61 0.31 275.23
EU membership 32376 0.01 0.12 0 1
state fragility index 30647 11.78 5.94 0 25
average agricultural share 32376 41.11 22.36 0.53 87.93
Note: w indicates that the corresponding variable is population-weighted.
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to the sea. In the following, our preferred estimation procedure is the FD estimator.
The FE estimator is consistent if current variations in our explanatory variables are
uncorrelated with past, present, and future error terms in our migration flow specifica-
tion (1). However, cross-country panel data with fixed T typically exhibit a high degree
of autocorrelation, which in turn makes the requirement for a consistent FE estimate
less likely to be met. The FD estimator is consistent under the less restrictive assump-
tion that changes in the explanatory variables are uncorrelated only with contemporan-
eous changes in the error term. Furthermore, the utilization of year-to-year changes in
the estimation procedure appears to be more closely related to the proposed mechan-
ism between migration and climate change.
Table 2 shows the results obtained from estimating specification (1) in first differ-
ences. Both climate variables show a positive and significant effect. More specifically, a
1° Celsius higher average temperature in the countries of origin is associated with a 1.9
percentage increase in migration flows between a country pair over one year. Further, a
change in average precipitation in the countries of origin by 1 millimetre corresponds
to a 0.5 percentage change in emigration flows.
In order to translate these estimates into actual numbers of additional migrants, we
multiply the estimated coefficients of the climate variables by the average value of the
bilateral migration flows (1,953 persons) and by the number of country pairs (19 * 142 =
2,698), proceeding as if every country of destination received flows from every country
of origin. The resulting number of 100,115 additional migrants with a one-unit-increase
in temperature seems impressive; however, it has to be kept in mind that its pre-
condition is a simultaneous increase in temperature by 1° Celsius in all countries of
origin. As we have previously described, this is quite far from the actual changes we
observe in our sample, where the yearly changes in temperature average only 0.013° Celsius.
Multiplying 100,115 by this average yields 1,301 additional migrants per year. Per-
forming the corresponding calculations with regard to precipitation, we obtain the
result of 753 additional migrants due to an increase in precipitation by the average of
Table 2 Determinants of bilateral migration flows - Static model in first differences
Dependent variable: log migration flow (1)
Independent variables:
weighted temperature origin 0.019*
(0.011)




GDP destination 1000 −0.010*
(0.006)
GDP origin 1000 −0.065***
(0.018)














Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels at one, five and ten percent, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Year dummies are included.
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effects of changes in temperature and precipitation, as these changes are negatively
correlated in our sample.
Among the economic variables introduced to account for the standard pull and push
factors of migration in the host and the sending countries respectively, almost all of
them have a highly significant impact on migration, with the estimated coefficients
showing the expected signs. Fluctuations in the unemployment rates in the destination
countries are apparently very relevant for the decision to emigrate, since an increase in
unemployment by one percentage point decreases the inflow of migrants by seven
percent. Notably, the effect of increasing GDP per capita in the sending countries by
$1,000 has about the same magnitude. Further, our quadratic specification reveals an
inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income in the sending countries and
emigration, but the estimated turning point of the hitherto negative relationship far
exceeds the sample mean of income in the countries of origin.
Turning to demographic variables, demographic pressure shows a positive, but insig-
nificant relation with migration, while a one percent increase in the sending countries’
population is associated with a 0.8 percent decrease in emigration.
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pletely unrelated to its specific bilateral migration flows, the accession to the European
Union boosts emigration by about 30%.4.3 Robustness checks
Next, we perform a series of sensitivity checks and explore some modifications of our
basic model. Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results of applying the FE instead of the
FD estimator to specification (1). As previously outlined, we continue to prefer the esti-
mation in first differences, but it is noteworthy that the FE estimator yields the same
signs for our two coefficients of interest.
In column 2, the first lags of the climate variables are added to specification (1) in
order to allow for a longer response time to climatic variations. The results indicate
that with regard to changes in average temperature, the reaction of the bilateral migra-
tion flows indeed exhibits a considerable time lag since the estimated coefficient of the
lagged changes in average temperature has nearly the same magnitude as the coefficient
for the contemporaneous ones. In addition, both coefficients are very precisely
estimated, with the coefficient of the contemporaneous changes now being significant
at the 1% level.
In column 3, we in turn add the first lag of the migration flows as an independent vari-
able in order to control for possible short-run migration dynamics and partial adjustment
effects. The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is highly significant, but
it is well-established that the FD estimator does not yield a consistent estimate of a
dynamic specification in a setting of (at most) twelve time periods, which is why we do
not attach an economic interpretation to the coefficient of the lagged migration flows.
More importantly, while the climate variables do not show significant effects in this
specification (p = 0.148 for average temperature and p = 0.14 for average precipitation),
the signs of their coefficients do not change, and their magnitude is hardly affected. We
have applied several GMM specifications for dynamic panel data models. However, the
associated testing procedures indicated that the various sets of instruments lacked both
robustness and explanatory power, which is why we do not report the results here.
Finally, column 4 presents the results from estimating specification (1) without the
European countries of origin. The latter comprise the states of Central and Eastern
Europe as well as the Balkan states and Cyprus. These countries generally exhibit a
strong tendency of emigration towards the European high-income countries in our
sample. It is noteworthy that the significance of the temperature coefficient disappears,
but the magnitudes of the impacts of the climate variables are only marginally affected.
This indicates that while changes in temperature are not necessarily irrelevant for
immigration from the rest of the sending countries, the European sending countries’
emigration flows add substantial precision to our estimates. This in turn may suggest the
uncommon notion that emigration due to climate changes is neither restricted to nor
most pronounced for outflows from the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries.4.4 Explorations of potential channels
Before we conclude, we turn our attention towards some potential channels which might
be responsible for the observed robust correlation between changes in temperature and
Table 3 Determinants of bilateral migration flows - Robustness checks
Dependent variable: log migration flow (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables:
Lag.log migration flow −0.265***
(0.016)
weighted temperature origin 0.058*** 0.031*** 0.015 0.013
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
weighted precipitation origin 0.001 0.006** 0.004 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Lag.weighted temperature origin 0.024**
(0.011)
Lag.weighted precipitation origin 0.001
(0.003)
unemployment destination −0.132*** −0.070*** −0.092*** −0.064***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
GDP destination 1000 0.027*** −0.012** −0.004 −0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP origin 1000 −0.092*** −0.058*** −0.089*** −0.046**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
GDP origin 1000 sq 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
demographic pressure 0.024* 0.019 0.029* 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
log population −0.505 −0.723* −1.185*** −0.802*
(0.345) (0.370) (0.451) (0.469)
trade to GDP ratio 0.001 0.000 0 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EU membership 0.304*** 0.308*** 0.245*** omitted
(0.071) (0.063) (0.042) (.)
R-squared 0.022 0.092 0.015
N 14042 13592 11996 11731
RMSE 0.486 0.561 0.521 0.578
F-test 41.77 15.83 31.05 11.92
Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels at one, five and ten percent, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Year dummies are included. Column (1) applies the FE estimator to the model in levels. Column (2)
estimates the model in first differences, adding the first lags of the climate variables. Column (3) estimates the model
in first differences using the first lag of the migration flows as dependent variable. Column (4) excludes the European
countries of origin.
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consider the roles of agriculture and internal conflict in the countries of origin.
We start by investigating the notion that very agriculturally-dependent sending coun-
tries could be relatively more affected by changes in temperature and precipitation as
these changes might reduce crop yield and thereby threaten the income and even the
food supply of a substantial part of the population. This should translate into higher
emigration from these countries compared to less agricultural-dependent ones. As our
time frame is too short to offer sufficient within-country variation in agricultural
Backhaus et al. IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:3 Page 10 of 15dependence, we split our sample by classifying a sending country as agriculturally-
dependent if the share of agricultural land in its total land area exceeds 50%,
which applies to 53 of the 142 countries of origin under consideration. Column 1
of Table 4 reports that for the agriculturally-dependent countries, the coefficient
of the temperature changes increases by 1.4 percentage points compared to the
pooled sample and is now significant at the 5% level, while changes in precipita-
tion no longer have a significant effect. The results for the less agriculturally-
dependent countries presented in column 2 tend towards the opposite direction,
as only the coefficient for precipitation changes remains significant and slightly
increases in magnitude. These findings are unaltered when raising the cutoff share
to 60%. Furthermore, they are consistent with the baseline results of a recent
contribution by Cai et al. (2014) which explores this potential channel in more
depth.
Next, we investigate a potential three-way link between climate change, a sending
country’s internal institutional and conflict environment, and emigration. An elaborate
presentation of the arguments connecting these three factors can be found in Reuveny
(2007). In short, we follow the notion that climate change may have more severeTable 4 Explorations of potential channels between migration and climate change
Dependent variable: log migration flow (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables:
weighted temperature origin 0.033** 0.008 0.020* 0.018
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
weighted precipitation origin 0.004 0.006* 0.006** 0.005*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
state fragility index 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
Lag.state fragility index 0.010* 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006)
wtemp origin * state fragility index −0.009
(0.013)
wpre origin * state fragility index −0.004
(0.003)
wtemp origin * Lag.state fragility index −0.004
(0.014)
wpre origin * Lag.state fragility index 0.001
(0.002)
R-squared 0.026 0.018 0.023 0.022
N 5584 8458 13434 13434
RMSE 0.527 0.577 0.557 0.557
F-test 10.22 8.41 16.37 14.15
Note: ***, **, * denote significance levels at one, five and ten percent, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Controls and year dummies are included. Column (1) uses only countries of origin which exhibit an
average share of agricultural land in their total land mass above 50%. Column (2) uses only countries of origin which
exhibit an average share of agricultural land in their total land mass below or equal to 50%. Column (3) estimates the
model in first differences, adding the state fragility index and its first lag. Column (4) estimates the model in first
differences, adding the state fragility index, its first lag, and interactions of the two with the climate variables.
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of managing it, which in turn causes more emigration. Our proxy measure for these
internal conflicts in the countries of origin is the State Fragility Index (SFI),
developed by the Center for Systemic Peace (2014), which ranges from 0 to 25.
The SFI is composed of two other indices, which in turn consist of indicators of a
state’s economic, political, social and security effectiveness and legitimacy. Column
3 of Table 4 contains the results from adding the SFI and its first lag to specifica-
tion (1). The weakly significant effect of the first lag implies that an increase in
the past SFI by one unit, which corresponds to an increase in fragility, is associ-
ated with a 1% increase in bilateral migration flows. Column 4 investigates the
suspected mechanism between climate change, fragility and emigration by interact-
ing the climate variables with the SFI and its first lag. The coefficient for
temperature is now insignificant, while the direct effects of the SFI and its lag
remain unchanged. However, none of the interaction terms exhibit a significant co-
efficient, which indicates no differential impact of climatic variations conditional
on a sending country’s internal stability.5. Conclusion
This paper documents a robust relationship between climate change and migra-
tion flows. In particular, increases in temperature and precipitation in a sending
country are shown to be associated with increases in migration flows to the re-
spective destination country. Our preferred specification suggests that the effect is
moderate, especially in relation to the actual climatic variations in our sample: a
one degree Celsius increase in temperature is associated with a 1.9 percent in-
crease in bilateral migration flows. An additional millimeter of precipitation is
associated with an increase in migration by 0.5 percent. This finding is robust to
a range of specifications, which also reveals the perhaps unanticipated importance
of climatic variations for emigration from European countries. A preliminary
examination of potential channels suggests that the reaction of migration due to
temperature changes may in particular be driven by a sending country’s agricul-
tural dependence.
We want to point out several avenues for future research. First, it would be interest-
ing to analyze variations in migration over time periods more extensive than 1995–
2006. Second, it might be worthwhile to disentangle the relative contributions of abrupt
versus gradual changes in climate. Climate catastrophes are the focus of most of the
existing literature, whereas the current study emphasizes gradual climate change. Third,
we want to point out that the current results are based on data of international migra-
tion to OECD countries. Therefore, they do not take into account that emigration as a
reaction to climate change may also manifest itself in a potential surge in the flows of
asylum seekers or undocumented migrants. Further, neither migration between the
non-OECD countries nor internal migration within the respective sending countries
are considered here, but these might be of high importance. Data availability poses the
main limitation for research in these directions, but narrowing the scope of analysis to
specific regions or even countries and exploiting finer spatial variation in climate could
deliver informative results.
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This appendix contains additional figures (Figure 3) and tables (Tables 5 and 6) that
supplement the main analysis in the paper.Figure 3 Total immigrant flow by destination country.
Table 5 List of countries and share of non-missing migration observations
Countries of destination
Australia 0.76 Germany 0.88 Spain 0.69
Austria 0.60 Italy 0.28 Sweden 0.57
Belgium 0.11 Japan 0.13 Switzerland 0.70
Canada 0.86 Korea 0.03 United Kingdom 0.39
Denmark 0.57 Netherlands 0.69 United States 0.82
Finland 0.50 Norway 0.84
France 0.82 Portugal 0.08
Countries of origin
Afghanistan 0.64 Gabon 0.37 Pakistan 0.74
Albania 0.61 Gambia 0.56 Panama 0.52
Algeria 0.65 Georgia 0.57 Papua New Guinea 0.29
Angola 0.61 Ghana 0.64 Paraguay 0.49
Argentina 0.62 Guatemala 0.54 Peru 0.64
Armenia 0.57 Guinea 0.54 Philippines 0.83
Azerbaijan 0.57 Guinea-Bissau 0.46 Poland 0.78
Bahamas 0.36 Guyana 0.49 Puerto Rico 0.02
Bangladesh 0.67 Haiti 0.46 Qatar 0.28
Belarus 0.57 Honduras 0.54 Romania 0.76
Belize 0.36 Hungary 0.62 Russian Federation 0.85
Benin 0.44 India 0.79 Rwanda 0.57
Table 5 List of countries and share of non-missing migration observations (Continued)
Bhutan 0.40 Indonesia 0.69 Samoa 0.20
Bolivia 0.57 Iran 0.70 Sao Tome&Principe 0.22
Bosnia&Herzegovina 0.69 Iraq 0.67 Saudi Arabia 0.52
Botswana 0.46 Jamaica 0.60 Senegal 0.60
Brazil 0.80 Jordan 0.60 Sierra Leone 0.54
Brunei Darussalam 0.30 Kazakhstan 0.57 Slovenia 0.57
Bulgaria 0.68 Kenya 0.60 Solomon Islands 0.11
Burkina Faso 0.48 Kuwait 0.43 Somalia 0.68
Burundi 0.53 Kyrgyzstan 0.53 South Africa 0.59
Cambodia 0.55 Laos 0.51 Sri Lanka 0.68
Cameroon 0.61 Latvia 0.59 Sudan 0.57
Cape Verde 0.46 Lebanon 0.66 Suriname 0.37
Central African Rep. 0.32 Lesotho 0.31 Swaziland 0.37
Chad 0.36 Liberia 0.54 Syria 0.63
Chile 0.60 Libya 0.56 Tajikistan 0.47
China 0.86 Lithuania 0.60 Tanzania 0.59
Colombia 0.63 Macedonia FYR 0.56 Thailand 0.82
Comoros 0.20 Madagascar 0.50 Timor-Leste 0.08
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.55 Malawi 0.50 Togo 0.54
Congo, Rep. 0.50 Malaysia 0.61 Trinidad and Tobago 0.57
Costa Rica 0.52 Mali 0.46 Tunisia 0.66
Côte d’Ivoire 0.58 Mauritania 0.46 Turkey 0.79
Croatia 0.64 Mauritius 0.59 Turkmenistan 0.43
Cuba 0.56 Mexico 0.63 Uganda 0.57
Cyprus 0.57 Moldova 0.61 Ukraine 0.69
Czech Republic 0.61 Mongolia 0.54 United Arab Emirates 0.44
Djibouti 0.43 Morocco 0.70 Uruguay 0.52
Dominican Republic 0.58 Mozambique 0.55 Uzbekistan 0.57
Ecuador 0.62 Myanmar 0.51 Vanuatu 0.14
Egypt 0.64 Namibia 0.50 Venezuela 0.68
El Salvador 0.53 Nepal 0.57 Viet Nam 0.79
Equatorial Guinea 0.22 New Zealand 0.62 Yemen 0.50
Eritrea 0.54 Nicaragua 0.54 Zambia 0.57
Estonia 0.60 Niger 0.49 Zimbabwe 0.56
Ethiopia 0.64 Nigeria 0.64
Fiji 0.45 Oman 0.45
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Table 6 List of variables and sources
Variable Definition Source
wtemp Population‐weighted average annual
temperature in degrees Celsius.
Constant 1990 population weights
Dell et al. (2008).
wpre Population‐weighted average annual
precipitation in millimeters. Constant
1990 population weights
Dell et al. (2008).
Immigrant inflow Inflow of population from sending
country i into host country j
Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (2014): OECD
International Migration Database.
Eurostat (2014): Immigration.
GDP per capita origin PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in
sending country at current US$




PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in host
country at current US$
World Bank (2010): World Development
Indicators Database.
Population Population in the sending country World Bank (2010): World Development
Indicators Database.
Demographic pressure Percentage or young population as a
share of working age population in the
sending country




Unemployment rate in the country of
destination, total (share of total labor
force)
World Bank (2010): World Development
Indicators Database.
Trade to GDP Sum of exports and imports of goods
and services measured as a share of
the sending country’s gross domestic
product
World Bank (2010): World Development
Indicators Database.
Share of agricultural land Share of sending country i’s land area
that is arable, under permanent crops,
and under permanent pastures
World Bank (2014): World Development
Indicators Database.
EU membership Dummy variable equals 1 if the country
of origin is a member of the European
Union
European Union (2014): EU member
countries.
State fragility index Ordinally scaled (0–25) measure of
sending country i’s state fragility
Center for Systemic Peace (2014): State
Fragility Index.
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